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ARTICLE III VERSUS BANKRUPTCY JUDGES AND
MAGISTRATES-A PARTIAL TRIUMPH OF PRINCIPLES
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS OVER THE PRAGMATISM
OF DOCKET CONGESTION.
. WILLIAM VANDERCREEK*
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 which greatly expanded
the jurisdiction of the federal Bankruptcy Court and conferred vir-
tually full independent judicial power upon the bankruptcy
judges," with the exception of article III status,' has been dealt a
capital blow by a divided United States Supreme Court in North-
ern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co." Not un-
like other capital cases, a stay of execution was initially granted
until October 4, 1982, to provide for congressional action. This
stay was judicially extended through December 24, 1982,6 to enable
Congress to revive and hopefully cure the fatal jurisdictional de-
fects of the Bankruptcy Act.7 The ninety-seventh Congress, how-
ever, failed to make any further progress on new bankruptcy legis-
*Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; B.S., 1952, Iowa State Univer-
sity; J.D. 1955, University of Iowa; LL.M., 1959, Yale.
This article was completed before the first session of the ninety-eighth Congress
convened.
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. II, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-160, 771-775, 1471-1482 (Supp. 11 1979)) (effective April 1, 1984).
2. The 1978 Act creates a United States Bankruptcy Court in each judicial district, elim-
inating the referee system utilized by the federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. at § 151(a).
The court's jurisdiction over title 11 (bankruptcy matters) includes "all of the jurisdiction
conferred by this section on the district courts." 28 U.S.C. at § 1471(c). This enables the
bankruptcy courts to entertain "all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. at § 1471(b).
3. Article III of the United States Constitution mandates as protection for judges exer-
cising the judicial power of the United States tenure during good behavior and a guarantee
against salary diminution. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S.
CoNsT. art. 11, § 1.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 does not afford these protections. The bankruptcy
judges are appointed for 14-year terms and may be removed for "incompetency, misconduct,
neglect of duty, or phyiical or mental disability." 28 U.S.C. at § 153. The salaries of the
judges are subject to adjustment under the Federal Salary Act of 1967. 28 U.S.C. at § 154.
4. 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
5. "This limited stay will afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy
courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication, without impairing the interim adminis-
tration of the bankruptcy laws." 102 S. Ct. at 2880 (Justice Brennan, writing for the plural-
ity, was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens).
6. 51 U.S.L.W. 3259 (1982).
7. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed bills addressing
Northern Pipeline).
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lation. As the solicitor general's motion to extend the stay of
judgment beyond the December 24 deadline was denied, the Su-
preme Court has effectively forced Congress to promptly restruc-
ture the bankruptcy courts, resurrect the pre-1978 system or aban-
don the issue leaving a multitude of bankruptcy suits with no
apparent jurisdiction. The Northern Pipeline decision and Con-
gress' resolution of the important questions decided therein will, of
necessity, have profound impact concerning the expanding role of
United States magistrates, which the Supreme Court recently up-
held in its present form in United. States v. Raddatz.8
Although there is precedent to support a holding that a judg-
ment by an article I tribunal of an article III case or controversy is
subject to collateral attack,9 in what could be labeled the anti-cata-
strophic or self-destruction exception, the Supreme Court has
made its ruling in Northern Pipeline prospective only."' Any other
ruling would be unthinkable, unless the separation of powers doc-
trine is supposed to promote anarchy."
This article will examine the strengths and weaknesses of the
two, and possibly four, political alternatives from which Congress
must choose. The two apparent choices are (1) to confer article III
status upon bankruptcy judges, or (2) to reduce the independent
judicial power of the bankruptcy judges and place them under the
direct supervision and control of the district judges, to the extent
that they may be fairly analogized as the functional equivalent of a
8. 447 U.S. 667 (1980). See Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Ju-
risdiction of Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023, 1027-28 and 1028
n.27 (1979); Comment, An Expanding Civil Role for United States Magistrates, 26 AM.
U.L. REv. 66 (1976).
9. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828). See Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 533 (1962) ("Article III, § 1,. . . is explicit and gives the petitioners a
basis for complaint without requiring them to point to particular instances of mistreatment
in the record."). In Canter, Chief Justice Marshall reached the constitutional issue on the
rationale that the judgment would be void on collateral attack. In Glidden, the Court con-
sidered the article III status of a judge to be a jurisdictional issue, which could be raised for
the first time on appeal. The Court noted that res judicata principles were not involved. The
Court has upheld lack of subject matter jurisdiction from collateral attack. See Durfee v.
Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 112-16 (1963).
10. 102 S. Ct. at 2880. The Court cited Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), in
setting forth the three considerations as to the retroactive application of a holding. First,
the Court found "Congress' broad grant of judicial power to non-Art. III bankruptcy judges
present[ed] an unprecedented question of interpretation of Art. III." Next, the Court in
pragmatic fashion reasoned that to apply the decision retroactively "would not further the
operation of our holding." Finally, the Court stated the obvious- the decision would "visit
substantial injustice and hardship upon those litigants who relied upon the Act's vesting of
jurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts." Id.
11. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 315-20 (J. Madison) (J. Gideon ed. 1818).
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special master. A variation of the second choice would be merely to
remove jurisdiction over controversies such as the one involved in
Northern Pipeline.12 The third choice would be for Congress to
create an administrative bankruptcy system with attendant juris-
diction vested in an administrative agency as has been done, for
example, in reference to labor disputes and the National Labor Re-
lations Board.' 3 The availability of this choice, and the variation of
the second option, would depend upon prognosticating correctly
the views of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor.14
At this juncture the House appears to have opted for the choice
of conferring article III status on bankruptcy judges while the Sen-
ate appears to favor reducing the independence and power of the
bankruptcy judges.' 5 The proposed bills are too divergent to be
12. Northern Pipeline Construction Company instituted the lawsuit in district court
charging Marathon Pipe Line Company with breach of contract and warranty and seeking
enforcement of a mechanics lien. Thereafter, Northern filed in bankruptcy court for reor-
ganization under chapter eleven of the Bankruptcy Code.
As a debtor in a proceeding for reorganization, Northern filed its pending suit against
Marathon in bankruptcy court. Marathon moved for dismissal but its motion was denied by
the bankruptcy court. Marathon's motion to appeal was first denied by the district court,
then granted upon reconsideration. The district court dismissed the adversary proceeding
against Marathon holding that the delegation of authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 to the bank-
ruptcy judges was an unconstitutional delegation of jurisdiction.
13. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
14. Justice Rehnquist, with Justice O'Connor joining, concurred in a separate opinion in
the judgment of the plurality, thus totalling six justices finding the 1978 Act's broad grant
of jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges unconstitutional. Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting
opinion and Justice White authored a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Powell joined.
15. H.R. 6978 proposes to elevate bankruptcy judges to article III status. The bill was
introduced on August 12, 1982, by House Representative Rodino. H.R. 6978, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., 128 Cong. Rec. H5871 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1982) (statement of Rep. Rodino). The bill
was reported favorably out of committee on August 9, 1982. House Comm. on the Judiciary,
Bankruptcy Court Act of 1982, H.R. REP. No. 807, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982). Represen-
tative Rodino is also chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. The Senate Judiciary
Committee has not yet acted on a bill proposing article III status.
In contrast to 6978, Senator Dole had supported a bill providing for bankruptcy cases to
be heard in the district courts, eliminating bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy judges would
comprise a division within the district court. Reportedly, Senator Dole (member of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee and chairman of its Subcommittee on Courts) and Senator Thur-
mond (Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee) vigorously oppose article III power
and protection for bankruptcy judges. 40 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2200-01 (No. 36, 1982); 40
Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2645 (No. 41, 1982). On October 1, 1982, Representative Butler intro-
duced an omnibus bill (concerning inter alia Federal Court Reform, Judicial Survivors An-
nuities, United States Trustee Program, Consumer Credit, Grain Elevator Bankruptcy
Amendments, Leasehold Management and a Bankruptcy Court Act) in the House, H.R.
7294, which contains Dole's proposals. H.R. 7294, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc.
E4649-51 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Rep. Butler).
H.R. 7294 creates within each district court a bankruptcy division consisting of district
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compromised through minor and technical amendments.' The po-
litical choices for Congress are every bit as hard as the constitu-
tional problems considered by the court."7 The constitutional pa-
rameter of Congress' options necessarily revolve on the perceptions
of the meaning of the Northern Pipeline decision. If one agrees
with the concurring opinion by Justice Rehnquist, with whom Jus-
tice O'Connor joins, the issue is quite simple and straightforward.
The plurality opinion of the court, however, written by Justice
Brennan with whom Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens
concurred, was predicated upon much broader principles, as re-
vealed by Justice Brennan's response to appellant's interpretation
of the 1978 Act:
Appellants suggest two grounds for upholding the Act's conferral
of broad adjudicative powers upon judges unprotected by Art. III.
First, it is urged that "pursuant to its enumerated Article I pow-
ers, Congress may establish legislative courts that have jurisdic-
tion to decide cases to which the Article III judicial power of the
United States extends". . . Second, appellants contend that even
if the Constitution does require that this bankruptcy-related ac-
tion be adjudicated in an Art. III court, the Act in fact satisfies
that requirement. "Bankruptcy jurisdiction was vested in the dis-
judges assigned to the division. As the district court judges sitting in the bankruptcy divi-
sion remain district court judges, the 1978 Act's tenure and salary provisions are no longer
necessary. H.R. 7294 was referred to the House Judiciary Committee though no action has
been taken on it yet. Also, there is a possibility that Senator Dole's proposals could be
tacked onto S. 2000, the bill that would make it tougher to declare consumer bankruptcies.
40 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2201 (No. 36, 1982). This may be the only recourse for those
senators opposing article III status for bankruptcy judges. The chances of a similar bill, such
as H.R. 7294, surviving Chairman Rodino's Judiciary Committee on the House side would
appear slim. See 128 CONG. REc. S13050-51 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statements of Sen. Dole
and Sen. Metzenbaum).
16. The conflicting positions of the two bills are apparent, especially considering the po-
litical makeup of the House and Senate and their respective Judiciary Committees.
Additionally, a third bill, H.R. 7132, was introduced by Rep. Kastenmeier and referred to
the House Judiciary Committee on September 16, 1982. H.R. 7132, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. Rac. H7173, E4253-54 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1982) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
H.R. 7132 was sponsored by the Judicial Conference of the United States which is headed
by Chief Justice Burger and gives the bankruptcy courts a jurisdiction similar to that
granted by the 1978 Act. Under H.R. 7132, a case may be recalled by motion, or by the
district or bankruptcy judge. The district judge shall then determine the case or refer it to a
United States magistrate. It is questionable whether this bill creates a true "adjunct" and
cures the article III deficiencies of the 1978 Act.
17. The battle lines are being drawn almost identically to those drawn over the 1978 Act.
In 1978, the Senate refused to endow bankruptcy judges with article III protections and the
resulting 1978 Act was a compromise by the House in order to allow the judges the broad
authority in § 1471. 40 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2200-01 (No. 36, 1982).
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trict court" of the judicial district in which the bankruptcy court
is located, "and the exercise of that jurisdiction by the adjunct
bankruptcy court was made subject to appeal as of right to an
Art. III court. '"
Justice Brennan's comment that "Congress cannot withdraw
from [art. III] judicial cognizance any matter which from its na-
ture is the subject of a suit at common law, or in equity or admi-
ralty," 1' must be interpreted to mean that Congress cannot with-
draw jurisdiction from an article III court and transfer it to an
article I court. The justice acknowledges that Congress could vest
all bankruptcy jurisdiction in state courts, but considered this ir-
relevant to the decision sub judice.20 It was on this broader issue
that the dissent of Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Powell, was bottomed."1
The opinion of Justice Rehnquist is not only appealing in sim-
plicity, but also relates directly to the issue that is most legiti-
mately presented by the facts of the cause.'2 One could speculate
as to the possibility of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor upholding
an administrative bankruptcy system. Rehnquist points out that
Marathon moved to dismiss the case due to the tenure and salary
shortcomings of the bankruptcy judges. As of yet in the Northern
Pipeline suit, argues Justice Rehnquist:
Marathon has simply been named defendant in a lawsuit about a
contract.... Marathon may object to proceeding further with
this lawsuit on the grounds that if it is to be resolved by an
agency of the United States, it may be resolved only by an agency
which exercises 'the judicial power of the United States' described
by Article III of the Constitution. But resolution of any objections
it may make on this ground to the exercise of a different author-
ity conferred on Bankruptcy Courts by the 1978 Act ... should
await the exercise of such authority.2 8
18. 102 S. Ct. at 2867 (quoting Brief for United States at 9, 12).
19. 102 S. Ct. at 2870 n.23 (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855) (emphasis added)).
20. 102 S. Ct. at 2867 n.15. Justice Brennan acknowledges that Congress in dealing with
public rights may create administrative remedies for initial determination by a federal
agency.
21. Id. at 2882 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell, J.).
22. The facts are set out in footnote 12, supra.
23. 102 S. Ct. at 2881 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Rehnquist does
not find the bankruptcy courts to be "adjuncts" of the district courts due to the presence of
"traditional appellate review" (lack of de novo review) and the bankruptcy courts' authority
to resolve "[a]ll matters of fact and law in whatever domains of the law to which the parties'
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Simply put, the bankruptcy proceeding in Northern Pipeline was
what previously would have been classified as plenary as distin-
guished from a summary action;"' that is, an independent suit
which would have been brought by the parties in either state court
or, if diversity or federal question jurisdiction would lie, in the fed-
eral district court.2 5 Northern Pipeline presented a traditional ju-
dicial controversy fully within the scope of article III and one that
but for the Bankruptcy Reform Act, would have been determined,
if in a federal court, by an article III judge.
With reference to the political choices available to Congress,
Chief Justice Burger, in a classic illustration of doing what cannot
be done under article III,2" gave Congress an advisory opinion:
It will not be necessary for Congress, in order to meet the require-
ments of the Court's holding, to undertake a radical restructuring
of the present system of bankruptcy adjudication. The problems
arising from today's judgment can be resolved simply by provid-
ing that ancillary common-law actions, such as the one involved
in this case, be routed to the United States district court of which
the bankruptcy court is an adjunct."
The singular advice of the Chief Justice would, of course, be sup-
ported by the rationale of the dissent, but certainly not by Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion.2" Congress may well choose to be cau-
dispute may lead." 102 S. Ct. at 2882. One might guess that a properly constructed adminis-
trative bankruptcy system would be approved by Rehnquist.
24. Before the 1978 Act, cases heard by bankruptcy referees covered only the disposition
of property held by the debtor and were termed "summary." See note, Scope of the Sum-
mary Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1940). Those claims
touching upon the debtor's property but not seeking distribution to creditors were "ple-
nary" and independent in nature from the bankruptcy itself.
25. One purpose of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act was to eliminate the summary/
plenary jurisdiction distinction. 102 S. Ct. at 2862. Agreeing that the pre-1978 summary/
plenary dichotomy resulted in wasteful litigation, undue cost and general inefficiency, there
was no call for a return to this system by the witnesses appearing in the hearings before the
congressional committee on the Northern Pipeline problem. House Comm. on the Judiciary,
H.R. Rep. No. 807, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 14-15 (1982).
As the Court noted in Northern Pipeline, the broad powers exercised by non-article III
bankruptcy judges prior to 1978 (under the summary/plenary system) "which represent the
culmination of years of gradual expansion of the power and authority of the bankruptcy
referee ... have never been explicitly endorsed by this Court." 102 S. Ct. at 2876 n.31.
26. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
27. 102 S. Ct. at 2882 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
28. Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality in Northern Pipeline, refrained from steer-
ing Congress to any one solution. Justice Brennan preferred leaving the job to "Congress to
determine the proper manner of restructuring the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 to conform to the
requirements of Art. III, in the way that will best effectuate the legislative purpose." Id. at
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tious in accepting the Chief Justice's solution as it does not meet
the fundamental problems of the independence of bankruptcy
judges and the vesting in them of virtually the full judicial powers
of an article III judge.
Considering that the sole purpose of article III was the establish-
ment of a judicial branch of a government to operate under an in-
tegrated system of checks and balances with the executive and leg-
islative branches in order to produce a true and meaningful
democracy,29 the Court's conceptual divergence concerning article
III is most troublesome. Indeed, although the equal protection
clause, for example, has produced a large mosaic of opinions that
do not necessarily merge into a simple pattern, the relatively few
cases concerning article III, particularly in later years, have been
marked by plurality decisions displaying fundamental differences
among the justices concerning the constitutional limitations placed
upon Congress."0
The framers of the Constitution in providing for the judicial
branch drafted article III to serve multiple functions. 1 To a large
extent, these are not seriously debatable. The article established
the Supreme Court while leaving its organization, such as the num-
ber of justices and term of court, to Congress.3 2 It vested the Su-
preme Court with certain original jurisdictions and authorized
Congress to confer additional jurisdictions upon the Supreme
Court and such inferior courts which Congress would from time to
2880 n.40.
29. "The Framers regarded the checks and balances that they had built into the tripar-
tite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggran-
dizement of one branch at the expense of the other." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122
(1976).
30. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Pklmore v. United States, 411 U.S.
389 (1973); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewa-
ter Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929); Mur-
ray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855); American
Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
31. "The judicial Power shall extend [1] to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; [21-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls; [3]-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; [41-to Contro-
versies to which the United States shall be a Party; [51-to Controversies between two or
more States; [61-between a State and Citizens of another State; [71-between Citizens of
different States; [8]-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and [9] between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79, 80, at 482-501
(A. Hamilton) (J. Gideon ed. 1818).
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-5 (1976).
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time establish, subject to the limitations and grants contained in
the article.33 All of the grants of jurisdiction, or more precisely au-
thorization to confer jurisdiction, are designated and defined as
well as limited by the case or controversy proviso.3 4 The nine de-
fined authorizations of subject matter jurisdiction that Congress
can confer, such as alienage, diversity, federal question and admi-
ralty, are considered separate grants. Thus even though a maritime
or admiralty claim could be thought of as involving federal law or
arising under constitutional powers, it does not constitute a case
"arising under" for purposes of federal question jurisdiction and
the corresponding right to a jury trial.3 5
Although early in the life of the Republic, and at a time the fed-
eral courts' dockets did little to justify their existence, Justice
Story expressed the view that Congress had the duty to confer the
whole of the jurisdiction possible under article III,"e it seems to be
beyond cavil today that Congress can confer less and may impose
statutory conditions and restrictions on the jurisdiction it does
choose to confer.37 The most common example of the latter is the
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2. The limitation in article I, § 1 is the source of the 1978
Act's failing. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensa-
tion, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. I, §
1.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. See C. WmGHT, LAw oF FaEaAL CouRTs § 12 (3d ed. 1976).
35. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
36. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 327-37 (1816) (sustaining § 25 of
the Judiciary Act giving the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over the courts).
37. It must be admitted, that if the Constitution had ordained and established the
inferior courts, and distributed to them their respective powers, they could not be
restricted or divested by Congress. But as it has made no such distribution, one of
two consequences must result, - either that each inferior court created by Con-
gress must exercise all the judicial powers not given to the Supreme Court, or that
Congress, having the power to establish the courts, must define their respective
jurisdictions. The first of these inferences has never been asserted, and could not
be defended with any show of reason, and if not, the latter would seem to follow
as a necessary consequence. And it would seem to follow, also, that, having a right
to prescribe, Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of
any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no juris-
diction but such as the statute confers. No one of them can assert a just claim to
jurisdiction exclusively conferred on another, or withheld from all.
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850).
See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewa-
ter Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 655 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter
so phrased Congress' power: "Congress need not establish inferior courts; Congress need not
grant the full scope of jurisdiction which it is empowered to vest in them; Congress need not
give this Court any appellate power; it may withdraw appellate jurisdiction once conferred
and it may do so even while a case is sub judice."
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jurisdictional amount limitation now found in diversity actions."8
The troublesome problems of article III that provide the grist for
the Northern Pipeline case concern the ability of Congress to com-
bine article I and article III jurisdiction and to create and utilize
administrative remedies for determination by a non-article III tri-
bunal. The problems, therefore, involve constitutional limitations
upon Congress' political options. The more recent plurality deci-
sions urge in support of their conflicting premises the primordial
and unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Marshall in
American Insurance Co. v. Canter.3 9 Although the reasons for op-
posing opinions to acclaim Canter may be attributed more to judi-
cial advocacy than an analysis of applicable constitutional princi-
ples, the rationale of Canter is an appropriate benchmark for
analysis. Canter involved a collateral attack on the final judgment
of a non-article III territorial court, granting a salvage award that
would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal district
court's admiralty and maritime power as authorized by article III
and conferred by Congress.40 Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion
accepts the premise that if Florida had been a state, the judgment
by the article I court could have been held void because it would
have been in direct contravention of article III. Marshall reasoned
the judgment involved in Canter did not contravene article III be-
cause the article did not apply to territories such as Florida prior
to statehood.41
Because it did not apply, the article could not limit Congress'
powers to establish, authorize and bestow jurisdiction on non-arti-
cle III tribunals within territories.42 Although this view of Canter
would seem to be uncontestable, the language of Chief Justice
Marshall, when lifted out of context, seemingly would invite im-
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
39. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). See Glidden Co. v Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); National
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). An excellent example of
article III conflict is the Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929), and Glidden Co.,
fight over the article III status of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
40. Spain ceded Florida to the United States in 1819. Florida continued as a territory of
the United States, governed by virtue of the constitutional directive to Congress in article
IV, § 3, to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Prop-
erty belonging to the United States." In 1822, an act establishing a territorial government in
Florida was passed. The law creating a territorial tribunal in Canter was a result of an
amendment to the 1822 act. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of an admiralty decree
even though it was rendered by the inferior territorial (non-article III) court.
41. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 546.
42. 1 J. MooRE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN, J. WICKER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 0.3 (2d ed. 1982) (hereinafter MooRE's FEDERAL PRA TICr).
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permissible conclusions:
These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts, in which the
judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general gov-
ernment, can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it.
They are legislative Courts, created in virtue of the general right
of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that
clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regu-
lations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States.
The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part of
that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the Con-
stitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those
general powers which that body possesses over the territories of
the United States."'
Marshall's statement does not mean that Congress cannot confer
jurisdiction upon a territorial or legislative court functioning
within a territory over a patent infringement suit, for example,
that must be brought in a federal district court sitting in one of the
states. Thus, not only may a territorial court exercise jurisdiction
over all of the disputes and controversies that could be conferred
upon an article III court sitting in one of the states, but, because
article III does not apply, the courts may possess full and complete
general jurisdiction."
Justice White's dissent not only chooses to misread Canter, by
arguing that Chief Justice Marshall was in error, but also strains
judicial advocacy to the point of intellectual dishonesty in assert-
ing Justice Harlan's plurality opinion in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok re-
pudiated Canter.4 5 "Far from being 'incapable of receiving' federal-
question jurisdiction, the territorial courts have long exercised a
jurisdiction commensurate in this regard with that of the regular
federal courts and have been subjected to the appellate jurisdiction
of this Court precisely because they do so."'4" To the contrary, Jus-
tice Harlan's opinion in Glidden reflects the clearest of under-
standings that the Canter decision is not restricted by Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 47 Tl~e Supreme
Court's decision in Canter fairly and squarely presents a rational
basis for repudiating the argument of the Northern Pipeline dis-
43. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 546.
44. 1 MooRw's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 1 0.4 (2d ed. 1982).
45. 102 S. Ct. at 2892-93.
46. Id. (quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 545 n.13 (1962)).
47. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
BANKRUPTCY JUDGES
sent. Article III does not limit Congress' power to confer jurisdic-
tion over a case or controversy upon a territorial court such as ex-
isted in Florida that otherwise would fall within article III, because
article III does not apply to such territories. The dissent in sub-
stance seeks to pretend that article III does not apply to federal
courts sitting within one of the states at the whim of Congress.
The great Chief Justice Marshall, whose Marbury v. Madison4' de-
cision valiantly achieved the reality of political power necessary to
convert from theoretical status the philosophic concepts of separa-
tion of powers and independence of the judiciary, would be aghast
to find that the greatest threat to article III is found within the
Supreme Court.
Indeed, territorial courts must possess general jurisdiction in or-
der to provide a total system of justice within the territory. No
other interpretation would work. All of the states at the time of
the adoption of the constitution had their own complete judicial
systems.49 Territories, on the other hand, would require a complete
judicial system emanating from the national sovereign.50 Tradi-
tional territorial status and territorial courts were inherently
ephemeral in abiding the transition to statehood. 1 In unincorpo-
rated territories like the Phillipines, the transition was to indepen-
dence.52 The application of article III to territories with its accom-
panying limitations would have produced an unacceptable void.
When a territory becomes a state, then such additional sovereign
can provide an adequate judicial system and article III can prop-
erly function to limit the federal judicial power of our dual sover-
eign system of federalism.
The principles of Canter are not directly applicable to the Dis-
trict of Columbia."3 Neither are the Court's decisions involving the
District of Columbia particularly helpful in determining the consti-
tutionality of the Bankruptcy Act.5"
As the permanent seat of the national sovereign, the District of
48. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
49. 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.1 (2d ed. 1982).
50. Id. 0.4[1] ("The Canter decision rests, then, on the principle that vis-a-vis the
States, the Congress exercises a limited judicial power, but as to the territories it exercises
the full powers of a sovereign, including the power to create judicial tribunals.").
51. Id. 1 0.4[3].
52. See id. 1 0.3[3.1].
53. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973). But see O'Donoghue v. United States,
289 U.S. 516 (1933).
54. See National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). See
also notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
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Columbia is a unique territory. Congress should be able to exercise
and create courts pursuant both to article III and article I powers
within the District of Columbia."5 Congress might well be able to
create an article I court and bestow jurisdiction over cases and
controversies that otherwise would fall within article III, and com-
bine in that court jurisdiction over disputes that do not constitute
a case or controversy within the meaning of article III. On the
other hand, if Congress does choose to create an article III court
within the District of Columbia, such court could not be conferred
with non-article III jurisdiction, 57 that is, the power to render advi-
sory opinions. The result is not as paradoxical as it might initially
appear because Congress, in the District of Columbia, should not
be limited to the option of only article I or only article III courts.
If Congress, in the District of Columbia, may exercise under article
I those sovereign powers that the sovereign state of Virginia can
exercise in the state of Virginia, it should be able to establish a
dual system of courts with the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction
by the non-article III court on all matters which have not been
exclusively vested in the article III court."e Indeed, one of the dis-
tinguishing features of American federalism is the exercise of con-
current jurisdiction by state courts over all cases and controversies
55. 411 U.S. at 406-07. In Palmore, the Court held that Congress could, under its article
I power to legislate for the District of Columbia, provide for trying criminal cases in the
district before courts with non-article III judges:
It was neither the legislative nor judicial view, therefore, that trial and decision of
all federal questions were reserved for Art. III judges .... We do not discount the
importance attached to the tenure and salary provisions of Art. Ill, but we con-
dude that Congress was not required to provide an Art. Ill court for the trial of
criminal cases arising under its laws applicable only within the District of Colum-
bia. Palmore's trial in the Superior Court was authorized by Congress' art. I power
to legislate for the District in all cases whatsoever.
411 U.S. at 402, 410.
56. 1 Moorz's FEDERAL PRAcricE 0.4[1] (2d ed. 1982) ("Article [I] limits the jurisdic-
tion of a constitutional court to cases and controversies, interpreted to mean that nonjudi-
cial functions cannot be imposed on such a court").
57. Id. 10.4[4] (classification of District of Columbia courts as hybrid).
58. This is the essential rationale of Palmore:
Here Congress has expressly created two systems of courts in the District. One of
them is made up of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
which are constitutional courts manned by Art. III judges to which the citizens of
the District must or may resort for consideration of those constitutional and stat-
utory matters of general concern which so moved the Court in O'Donoghue. The
other system is made up of strictly local courts, the Superior Court and the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals. These courts were expressly created pursuant
to the plenary Art. I power to legislate for the District of Columbia. 411 U.S. at
406-07.
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that can be brought in the federal court unless the national sover-
eign under the supremacy clause has vested the exclusive jurisdic-
tion in a federal instrumentality. 9
Crowell v. Benson60 and the other array of cases cited by the
dissent do not support the Chief Justice's proposal, as tempting as
it may be. 1 This is not to say that justices in prior opinions have
not expressed views that could be read in support. Not atypical of
such judicial dissonance is National Insurance Company v. Tide-
water Transfer Company, 2 cited by both the Northern Pipeline
plurality and the dissent.6 8 In Tidewater, three justices upheld the
constitutionality of a statute making a citizen of the District of Co-
lumbia a citizen of a "state" for diversity jurisdiction on the basis
that Congress could bestow article I jurisdiction on the federal dis-
trict courts sitting in the states.6 4 Six justices rejected such reason-
ing.65 Two justices upheld the constitutionality of the statute by an
expansive reading of article 111.6 Seven justices rejected this ratio-
nale. The statute was thus held constitutional because, as noted
by dissenting Justice Frankfurter, conflicting minorities of three
and two combined for a plurality of five."
The use of the Tidewater case as meaningful precedent is, of
59. 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.6[1], [3], [4] (2d ed. 1982).
60. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
61. 102 S. Ct. at 2891-92.
62. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
63. 102 S. Ct. at 2866, 2872 n.26, 2892-93.
64. The three-justice plurality consisted of Justice Jackson, joined by Justices
Black and Burton. 337 U.S. at 583, 604. A total of five justices upheld the statute
even though they were split as to the ground for so doing. Justices Rutledge and
Murphy concurred in sustaining the statute. 337 U.S. at 604.
65. The six (Rutledge, Murphy, Frankfurter, Reed, Vinson, Douglas) disagreed
with the plurality opinion as Congress had no power to enact the statute under
article I, § 8 which authorizes Congress to exercise exclusive legislation in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. However, this six-man faction was split as to whether there
were any grounds on which the statute was valid.
66. Justice Rutledge, joined by Justice Murphy, based the validity of the stat-
ute upon the view that the District of Columbia was the equivalent of a state
within article III, § 2, and thus Congress could pass such a statute by way of
article III. 337 U.S. at 604-26.
67. Only Rutledge and Murphy gave this expansive reading to article III.
68. A substantial majority of the Court agrees that each of the two grounds
urged in support of the attempt by Congress to extend diversity jurisdiction
to cases involving citizens of the District of Columbia must be rejected - but
not the same majority. And so, conflicting minorities in combination bring to
pass a result - paradoxical as it may appear - which differing majorities of
the Court find unsupportable.
337 U.S. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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course, replete with doubt.69 The only tenable and defensible view,
the expansive reading of article III expressed by Justice Rutledge,
could muster only one other supporting vote. 0
Justice Jackson's article I theories, which would support Chief
Justice Burger's proposal, were unfortunately founded upon falla-
cious premises, the principle one being that the exercise of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction by the federal district court was an illustration
and example of an article III court also conferred jurisdiction
under article 1.71 Thus, Congress could utilize other authorizations
of jurisdictional powers under article I for determination by an ar-
ticle III court. This also would mean that article III courts could be
required, by virtue of article I powers, to render advisory opinions.
Justice Jackson's thesis fails, however, not merely because of its
absurdity, but because, as noted by Justice Frankfurter, the exer-
cise of bankruptcy jurisdiction is a classic example of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction (a case "arising under") that is expressed or au-
thorized to be conferred under article III. "To find a source for the
'judicial power,' therefore, which may be exercised by courts estab-
lished under article III of the Constitution outside that article
would be to disregard the distribution of powers made by the
Constitution."7 2
69. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
70. 337 U.S. at 604.
71. Congress also is given power in Art. I to make uniform laws on the subject
of bankruptcies. That this, and not the judicial power under Art. III, is the
source of our system of reorganizations and bankruptcy is obvious. Not only
may the district courts be required to handle these proceedings, but Congress
may add to their jurisdiction cases between the trustee and others that, but
for the bankruptcy powers, would be beyond their jurisdiction because of
lack of diversity required under Art. III.
337 U.S. at 594 (citation omitted). Justice Jackson went on to observe:
[W]e must rely on the Art. I powers of the Congress. We have been cited to no
holding that such jurisdiction cannot spring from that Article. Under Art. I the
Congress has given the district courts not only jurisdiction over cases arising
under the bankruptcy law but also judicial power over nondiversity cases which do
not arise under that or any other federal law.
Id. at 599.
72. 337 U.S. at 652 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In
thorough fashion, Frankfurter continues:
[tihe congeries of controversies thus brought into being by reason of bankruptcy
may be lodged in the federal courts because they arise under "the Laws of the
United States," to wit, laws concerning the "subject of bankruptcies." It is a mat-
ter of congressional policy whether there must be a concourse of all claims affect-
ing the bankrupt's estate in the federal court in which the bankruptcy proceeding
is pending or whether auxiliary suits be pursued in other federal courts.
Id. at 652 n.3.
Frankfurter even receives aid from Justice Rutledge in dismissing Jackson's theories.
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If Justice Frankfurter's argument is not deemed immediately fa-
tal to the article I line of reasoning, the coup de gras is that Jack-
son's analogy example fails completely when applied to the Su-
preme Court. The Supreme Court, having been created by article
III, is certainly the purest of the pure article III tribunals .7  The
Supreme Court has consistently rejected jurisdiction to decide any
matter that does not come within article III.74 The Supreme Court,
of course, has decided countless bankruptcy cases and no one, not
even Justice Jackson, has been audacious enough to suggest that
this is an illustration of Congress conferring article I powers on the
Supreme Court. Even when the Supreme Court, under its appel-
late jurisdiction, is reviewing the decision of an article I tribunal,
the test is not whether the initial proceeding before the agency was
a case or controversy within article III, but whether the ruling ap-
pealed from and presented to the Supreme Court constitutes a
case or controversy.7 15
The Tidewater advantage as an article III precedent is simply
that it can be cited for most anything. Not surprisingly, both Jus-
tices Brennan and White cite Tidewater in support.7 ' To Justice
White's credit, however, he did not pursue and reiterate the views
of Justice Jackson which, of course, if valid, would have provided
considerable support to the constitutionality of the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Act. 77
Notwithstanding the justices' discussions in Northern Pipeline
of the District of Columbia precedent, such cases tend to obfuscate
the basic constitutional problems. A critical and better analysis of
the divergent views can be made by contrasting the support for an
adjunct or special master analogy with the support for utilization
of article I tribunals in areas of specialization. 78 Under this ap-
"[A]s Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion makes clear, federal court adjudication of disputes
arising pursuant to bankruptcy and other legislation is conventional federal-question juris-
diction. And no case cited in any of today's opinions remotely suggests the contrary." Id. at
611 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
73. 1 MooPz's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.7[2] (2d ed. 1982).
74. 1 MooRw's FnERiAL PRACTIcE 1 0.6[6] (2d ed. 1982).
75. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
76. Justice Brennan cites Frankfurter's dissent in Tidewater in text as support for re-
specting Congress' vestiture of jurisdiction to the non-article I1 bankruptcy courts. 102 S.
Ct. at 2866. Additionally, Justice Brennan cites Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion to
support the thought that "[t]his claim may be adjudicated in federal court on the basis of
its relationship to the petition for reorganization." Id. at 2872 n.26.
77. Id. at 2892-93.
78. See Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bank-
ruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 GEo. L.J. 297, 308-10 (1981).
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proach the reasoning of Justice White's dissent does not fare well.
This suggests that the Chief Justice's advice is fraught with consti-
tutional invalidity. It also suggests that "Congress' power to create
legislative courts to adjudicate public rights carries with it the
lesser power to create administrative agencies for the same pur-
pose, and to provide for review of those agency decisions in Art. III
courts.
79
The bankruptcy court's expanded jurisdiction, free from inter-
fering supervision and control by the federal district court, and the
autonomy of the bankruptcy judge, coupled with his investiture of
virtually full judicial power-the hallmarks of the 1978 re-
form-foreclose any fair analogy to the role of this new bankruptcy
judge to that of a special master.80 Justice White's position is sup-
ported neither by the terms of the Act nor by precedent. The case
proposed by the Chief Justice, if intended to be upheld under the
special master or adjunct theory, has two major faults. First, as
noted, taking away the bankruptcy judge's jurisdiction over the
Northern Pipeline types of cases does not in any way change the
judge's status and relationship with the article III courts to which
it is supposed to be an adjunct. If, however, the threatening possi-
bility of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor subscribing to the dis-
sent's adjunct argument is considered, a far greater political dan-
ger would arise that could threaten the very structure of the
separation of powers doctrine and independency of our judicial
system.81 It would mean that United States magistrates could be
given the same independence and powers. The desire of the article
III judiciary to shed the burden and problems of bankruptcy cases
cannot justify fantasizing the role of bankruptcy judges as adjuncts
in subjugation, if not sacrifice, of the principle of separation of
powers.
Justice White, in his dissent's intertwining of two essentially col-
lateral and independent arguments, adjuncts and specialization
79. 102 S. Ct. at 2869 n.18; Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 (1977). See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1937). See also Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. III 1979). See Expanding Role of U.S. Magistrates and Mas-
ters: A Panel, 47 A.B.A. ANTTRUST L.J. 1253 (1979); Berger, Away from the Courthouse
and into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLuM L. Rv. 707 (1978). As
Justice Brennan writes, "[u]nlike the administrative scheme that we reviewed in Crowell,
the Act vests all 'essential attributes' of the judicial power of the United States in the 'ad-
junct' bankruptcy court." 102 S. Ct. at 2878.
81. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 713 (1979).
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powers under article I, fails to mask their implicit and explicit
flaws. The diversion that the adjunct argument is so totally devoid
of merit that it makes the specialization argument superficially ap-
pear better by comparison, is not a sufficient buttress. There are
two aspects of the specialization argument discussed by the plural-
ity and the dissent.
The invalidity of the White dissent's reasoning concerning Con-
gress' Article I powers is not predicated so much upon the merits
of its arguments in the abstract, but the inapplicability of the posi-
tion in the context of the Bankruptcy Reform Act in the Northern
Pipeline case. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 did not create
an administrative remedy to be initially determined by an admin-
istrative body in which the United States was a party, as, for ex-
ample, Congress had done in the area of unfair labor disputes with
the National Labor Relations Board.82 Northern Pipeline's dispute
was not converted into an administrative matter; it was an old-
fashioned, traditional lawsuit that otherwise would have been
heard in state court, or if diversity existed, in a federal district
court. The Bankruptcy Reform Act simply took jurisdiction away
from those tribunals and placed the identical case before the non-
article III bankruptcy judge."5
The specialization argument, as presented in the context of this
case, would seem to be a sophisticated way of saying that because
bankruptcy cases are the unwanted stepchild of the federal judicial
system, they may be disinherited by Congress without heeding ar-
ticle III." Patent infringement, antitrust, securities and admiralty,
82. This is not to say that Congress could not create an administrative or adjunct bank-
ruptcy system to cure the constitutional defect. The 1978 Act simply was not drafted as an
administrative system. The plurality points to the basic principle underlying Crowell:
"Crowell recognized that Art. III does not require 'all determinations of fact [to] be made by
judges,'. . . with respect to congressionally created rights, some factual determinations may
be made by a specialized fact finding tribunal designed by Congress, without congressional
bar." 102 S. Ct. at 2876 (citations omitted).
To create an administrative or adjunct bankruptcy system, without conferring article I
status, Congress would have to remove some of the independence of the judges under the
1978 Act. "[T]he agency in Crowell was required by law to seek enforcement of its compen-
sation orders in the district court. In cottrast, the bankruptcy courts issue final judgments,
which are binding and enforceable even in the absence of an appeal." 102 S. Ct. at 2879.
83. See Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bank-
ruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 GEo. L.J. 297 (1981); Note, Article III Limits on
Article I Courts: The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrate
Act, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 560 (1980).
84. "The plurality concedes that Congress may provide for initial adjudications by Arti-
cle I courts or administrative judges of all rights and duties arising under otherwise valid
federal laws." 102 S. Ct. at 2883 (White, J., dissenting). However, Brennan is quick to re-
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to list a few, are considered by some to be areas of specialization.
The argument that specialization limitations could not lead to
"wholesale assignment of federal judicial business to legislative
courts" is aptly rejected by the plurality as "wholly illusory." 5
The unresolved aspect of specialization on which Justices Rehn-
quist and O'Connor might have joined the dissent, if the issue were
presented by the case, is whether Congress in the area of bank-
ruptcy could create an administrative remedy to be presented to
an administrative agency in which the United States would be a
party.8 6 Justice Rehnquist does not say that an administrative sys-
tem is invalid. Rather, he merely states that the 1978 Act fails to
create a constitutional administrative bankruptcy system.87
The plurality in dicta contends that Congress could not do so.
After first noting that Congress did not constitute the bankruptcy
court as a legislative court, Justice Brennan acknowledges that
when Congress creates a substantive right, Congress has some pow-
ers concerning the "adjudication [of] that right."8 8 This power al-
lows Congress to create an administrative agency in which the
United States is a necessary party. 9 The plurality, however, con-
tends "the substantive legal rights at issue in the present action
cannot be deemed 'public rights.' "90 The implication is that the
substantive rights could not have been converted to public rights if
spond [wle do not concede" that Congress can delegate as Justice White suggests. "Rather
we simply reaffirm the holdigg of Crowell- that Congress may assign to non-Art. III bodies
some adjudicatory functions. Crowell itself spoke of specialized functions." Brennan informs
White that "[tihis case does not require us to specify further any limitations that may exist
with respect to Congress' power to create adjuncts to assist in the adjudication of federal
statutory rights." Id. at 2876 n.32.
85. Id. at 2872-73.
86. See infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
87. Id. at 2882 ("the extent of review by Art. III courts provided on appeal from a deci-
sion of the Bankruptcy Court in a case such as Northern's does not save the grant of author-
ity to the latter under the rule espoused in Crowell v. Benson").
88. Id. at 2878 n.35.
89. The plurality attempts a detailed discussion of the public rights doctrine-the basis
of which could sustain the creation of an administrative bankruptcy system. One aspect of
the doctrine focuses on the "necessity" of the United States as a participant:
It is thus clear that the presence of the United States as a proper party to the
proceeding is a necessary but not sufficient means of distinguishing "private
rights" from "public rights".... Moreover, when Congress assigns these matters
to administrative agencies, or to legislative courts, it has generally provided, and
we have suggested that it may be required to provide, for Art. III judicial review.
Id. at 2870-71 n.23 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The major exception to the doctrine is that it "does not extend to any criminal matters,
although the government is a proper party." Id. at 2871 n.24.
90. Id. at 2871.
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Congress had created an administrative remedy for adjudication by
an administrative agency in which the United States is a party.
The unresolved constitutional issue is whether Congress has the
political choice to create for all bankruptcy matters an administra-
tive remedy for determination by a federal agency to replace judi-
cial remedies cognizable in an article III court. If so, then Congress
has three different categories of choices and is not limited to either
conferring the bankruptcy judges with article III status,9' or re-
vamping the bankruptcy act to cede jurisdiction of what previously
were plenary matters and placing the control and supervision of
the bankruptcy judge sufficiently under the agency of a district
courts' on a true adjunct or special master relationship. Notwith-
standing the divergence of the judicial views concerning article III,
Congress surely does have all three choices. Crowell v. Benson"
and other cases on which both the plurality and dissent rely do not
preclude the option to create an appropriate bankruptcy agency.
Considering the time constraints for creative legislation, however,
Congress may well prefer to consider its other political options."
The problems surrounding Crowell v. Benson are most analogous
to the alternative bankruptcy choices which now must be resolved
by Congress. Crowell should not be considered authority which
would preclude Congress from creating an administrative remedy
and agency to handle most bankruptcy matters. Crowell was de-
cided during the formative years of administrative law when the
judiciary evidenced suppression and hostility towards its emer-
gence and the New Deal legislation that spawned it. Crowell can be
fairly read to support Congress' right to create an administrative
remedy in lieu of a judicial remedy and vest such in an administra-
tive agency. It is difficult, however, to read Crowell in support of
the theories expressed by either Justice Brennan or Justice White.
The narrow issue in Crowell was whether the federal district
court could determine de novo what was labeled a jurisdictional
fact:
It is the question whether the Congress may substitute for consti-
tutional courts, in which the judicial power of the United States
is vested, an administrative agency-in this instance a single dep-
uty commissioner-for the final determination of the existence of
91. H.R. 6978. See supra note 15.
92. H.R. 7294. See supra note 16.
93. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
94. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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the facts upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights
of the citizen depend."5
The administrative scheme in Crowell upon which the issue
arose differs significantly from the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act. The Court stated in Crowell:
Familiar illustrations of administrative agencies created for the
determination of such matters are found in connection with the
exercise of the congressional power as to interstate and foreign
commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health,
the facilities of the post office, pensions and payments to
veterans.
The present case does not fall within the categories just de-
scribed but is one of private right, that is, of the liability of one
individual to another under the law as defined. But in cases of
that sort, there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the
essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of
fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges."
The Court considered the issue of employment to be a jurisdic-
tional fact in that the Act did not authorize relief to be otherwise
provided.' 7 The more traditional type of jurisdictional fact would
be the state of a party's citizenry in a suit invoking diversity juris-
diction. The Court noted the act did not expressly prohibit the
court from reexamining jurisdictional facts, and that such con-
struction was preferable because it would obviate constitutional
problems: "[t]he Congress has not expressly provided that the de-
terminations by the deputy commissioner of the fundamental or
jurisdictional facts as to the locality of the injury and the existence
of the relation of master and servant shall be final."'"
Because the scope of review was to invoke the equity powers of a
federal court, additional evidence could be considered. "We think
that the essential independence of the exercise of the judicial
power of the United States, in the enforcement of constitutional
rights requires that the federal court should determine such an is-
sue upon its own record and the facts elicited before it." 9 These
constitutional problems did not relate to the political power of
95. 285 U.S. at 56.
96. Id. at 51.
97. Id. at 54-57.
98. Id. at 62.
99. Id. at 64.
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Congress to opt for an administrative remedy to be determined by
a federal agency.
The Crowell Court's constitutional concerns over the extent of
review that an article III court must possess over an agency have
been long laid to rest. The distinction between public and private
rights that permeated Crowell also seems to have disappeared.
Under the police power to promote the general welfare, and the
necessary and proper clause, 100 private rights may easily be trans-
formed into public rights. Considering that the Constitution ex-
pressly vests control of bankruptcy in the national sovereign"0 ' and
the general public importance of providing appropriate relief to
debtors and creditors, the distinction between public and private
rights as a basis for constitutionally limiting the power of Congress
evaporates.
If Congress chooses to maintain the current status of bankruptcy
judges under article I and wishes to maintain the basic structure of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, this can be accomplished.
First of all, the Constitution gives Congress plenary powers over
bankruptcy. 02 Whatever continued vitality Crowell may have in
reference to the necessity for public rights could easily be solved
by simply vesting in the United States the rights and interests of
the bankrupt. These rights and interests could be awarded, admin-
istered and determined by a new federal agency. The structural
changes necessary to accomplish this would be minimal and would
be within the framework of the existing act. The essential aspect
would be that the United States would become a named party,
making claims and actions by and against the United States. °1
The Act thus could continue to allow, for example, a debtor in pos-
session to operate a business under an arrangement or a plan of
reorganization. Claims or choses in action that the bankrupt entity
has would pass to the United States for assertion. Thus, in the pre-
sent Northern Pipeline case, the action would be brought in the
name of the United States, which would receive any of the pro-
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
101. "The Congress shall have Power. . . [t]o establish ...uniform Laws on the sub-
ject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
103. Such a structure would overcome Justice Brennan's refusal to recognize Crowell
and the public rights doctrine's applicability to bankruptcy matters. In an area where it is
certainly true as stated by Justice Brennan - "[tlhe distinction between public rights and
private rights has not been definitively explained in our precedents" - one would be hard
pressed under this proposed structure to challange the public rights doctrine. 102 S. Ct. at
2870-72.
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ceeds as a result of such litigation and which would then be dis-
tributed in accordance with the bankruptcy administration. As it is
unquestioned that Congress can vest disputes between employer
and employees before a federal agency that otherwise would have
been determined in state or federal court, it would have no less
power in reference to bankruptcy. 10 4
Probably the more appealing choice from both the political per-
spective and the efficiency of the federal judiciary would be, as
proposed in the house bill, to confer article III status upon bank-
ruptcy judges.10 5 The advantage would be that such judges also
could carry on additional functions in the federal district court and
any slack time in the bankruptcy docket could be filled by assist-
ing with the other demands on the federal district court. The diffi-
culty will be whether to, in essence, "grandfather in" the current
bankruptcy judges as federal judges or to enter into a new selection
process. 08 Certainly there is no reason that would constitutionally
require the present bankruptcy judges to be named and conferred
article III status. The issue will arise, however, in reference to a
bankruptcy judge who has been given a statutory tenure if he is
not selected and confirmed as an article III judge. One possible
solution would be to reduce the number of article III judges ap-
pointed from the current number of bankruptcy judges and to util-
ize some of the bankruptcy judges who are not given article III
status as special masters. This aplroach does present some circular
aspccts. If some of the current bankruptcy judges are not going to
be named as article III judges and their services, in order to com-
ply with the statutory tenure commitment, are going to be satisfied
by utilizing such personnel as bankruptcy special masters, why not
simply use all of the current bankruptcy judges as special masters
and make a nominal increase in the number of federal district
court article III judges? This would mean that Congress would
provide sufficient manpower in the form of article III judges to try
such cases as the instant Northern Pipeline decision but also
would utilize the current bankruptcy judges as true adjuncts. This
104. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
105. See supra note 15.
106. Should Congress opt to confer article III status upon bankruptcy judges, it would
entail approximately 200 appointments and confirmations, a possibility in which Congress
has not exhibited confidence. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Com-
mercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, H.R. 6109, 97th
Cong. 2d Sess. 5, 12-16, 23-24, 26-27, 35 (1982). H.R. 6109 was the forerunner of H.R. 6978.
House Comm. on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Court Act of 1982, H.R. Rep. No. 807, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982).
BANKRUPTCY JUDGES
would require, however, further restructuring of the Reform Act to
make such judges directly accountable to and reviewable by the
federal district court, including the power to require that the arti-
cle III judge has the power to control the reference of the proceed-
ings to the ancillary bankruptcy judge, the power to revoke any
such reference and to review and recommend orders by the bank-
ruptcy judge as well as the right to take additional evidence. 10 7 The
role of the bankruptcy judge if he is going to be converted into an
adjunct or the equivalent of a special master should not exceed the
independence displayed by the United States magistrate that the
Supreme Court upheld in Raddatz.'08 This compromise would
avoid the necessity of returning bankruptcy practice to the pre-
1978, if not 1976 era. Considering the hundreds of thousands of
bankruptcy matters that are filed on an annual basis, there is cer-
tainly justification for Congress creating a limited number of arti-
cle III judges whose primary responsibility would be bankruptcy.
Congress should also well consider establishing a new United
States Court of Appeals for bankruptcy. The occasion for this ap-
proach is not merely to reduce the possibility of intercircuit con-
flict but to provide a means of quickly and expeditiously resolving
bankruptcy disputes. Such cases now are not priority matters and
are apt to languish for time periods on appeal that create by the
mere passage of time geometric problems in the administration of
the bankruptcy estate. It will, however, not permit the luxury of
Congress making a political choice upon reflective analysis of the
various available alternatives. Congress must act swiftly and quick-
ly. Perhaps the final danger is that the need to expedite action will
prove more pressing than the preservation of separation of powers
principles.
Congress's choice of solutions may have been effectively pre-
empted by the Supreme Court's denial of an additional stay. The
impact could be considered a power ploy by the Chief Justice to
effect adoption of his advisory suggestion, which has been promul-
gated by interim Bankruptcy Rules recommended by the Judicial
Conference.' The adoption of these rules has temporarily sus-
pended chaos.
To avoid chaos, the lower federal courts may well be tempted to
107. 102 S. Ct. at 2874-80. Thus, the federal district courts would be replenished with
"most, if not all, of 'the essential attributes of the judicial power.'" Id. at 2880.
108. See supra note 8.
109. See 3 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 68,908 (Dec. 1982); see also National Law Journal,
January 31, 1983, at 3.
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uphold the constitutionality of the Interim Rules, and fact accom-
pli might then have to be granted recognition by Congress. The
political make-up of the present government seemingly would ne-
cessitate an adroit compromise, indeed.
